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We propose easy implementable protocols for robust quan-
tum key distribution with the collective dephasing channel or
collective rotating channel. In these protocols, Bob only takes
passive photon detection to measure the polarization qubits
in the random bases. The source for the protocol with collec-
tive rotating channel is made by type 2 spontaneous paramet-
ric down conversion with random unitary rotation and phase
shifter, no quantum disentangler is required. A simple proof
for unconditionally security is shown.
Consider the following collective dephasing channel to
polarization qubits [1]:
|0〉 −→ eiφ0 |0〉; |1〉 −→ eiφ1 |1〉
|0〉|1〉 −→ ei∆|0〉|1〉; |1〉|0〉 −→ ei∆|1〉|0〉 (1)
and ∆ = φ0 + φ1. Here |0〉, |1〉 represent for horizon-
tal and vertical polarization states respectively. Ob-
viously, 2-qubit state |01〉, |10〉 and their arbitrary lin-
ear superposition will be robust via the above defined
noise, since they will only obtain an unimportant over-
all phase shift which is not detectable. Naturally, one
may consider to replace the original single qubit BB84
states [2] by the 2-qubit states randomly chosen from
the set {|01〉, |10〉, 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)} to do
the quantum key distribution (QKD) [2,3] if the dom-
inant channel noise is the above defined collective de-
phasing noise. There has been a proposal on how to ex-
perimentally realize the decoherence-free subspace QKD
very recently [4,5]. However, no security proof for any of
such type of protocols is given so far. Also, the existing
protocol [5] with collective rotating error uses 4-photon
state which is technically very difficult in practice. In
this paper, we propose easy implementable robust QKD
protocols with both collective dephasing channel [4] and
collective rotating channel [5] and we also give a simple
proof for the unconditional security in both cases. We
first give a QKD protocol that tolerates the collective
phase error as the following:
protocol 1 1: Alice creates (4 + δ)n single qubit state
randomly chosen from {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} (|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉±
|1〉)) and (4 + δ)n ancilla which are all in state |0〉. She
then encodes each individual qubit with an ancilla into
a 2-qubit code through |00〉 −→ |01〉; |10〉 −→ |10〉 where
the second qubit states in the left hand-side of the ar-
rows are for the ancilla. After this operation, she now
has made (4 + δ)n 2-qubit quantum codes with each of
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them randomly chosen from the set {|01〉, |10〉, 1√
2
(|01〉+
|10〉), 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)}. 2: For each 2-bit code, she puts
down the “preparation basis” as “Z basis” ({|0〉, |1〉} ba-
sis) if it is in state |01〉 or |10〉 and the preparation
basis as “X basis” ({|±〉}) if it is in one of the states
{ 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)}. For those code states
of |01〉 or { 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), she denotes a bit value 0 ; for
those code states of |10〉 or { 1√
2
(|01〉− |10〉), she denotes
a bit value 1. 3: Alice sends the 2-qubit codes to Bob. 4:
Bob receives the (4+δ)n 2-qubit codes. To each code, He
measures the first qubit (the one in the right position of
the state) in X basis and then measures the other qubit
(say, qubit 2) in either X basis or Z basis after taking
a unitary transformation U to it. Unitary U to qubit 2
is dependent on the measurement outcome of qubit 1: If
the outcome is |+〉, U is unity, I; if it is |−〉, U is σz which
is defined by σz|0〉 = |0〉;σz|1〉 = −|1〉. Bob denotes his
“measurement basis” just the same as his measurement
basis to qubit 2. And, if the outcome to qubit 2 is |0〉 or
|+〉, he puts down a bit value 0; if the outcome to qubit
2 is |1〉 or |−〉, he puts down a bit value 1. 5: Alice an-
nounces her “preparation basis” for each codes. 6: Alice
and Bob discards those bits on which Bob has measured
in a basis diffrent from Alice’s preparation basis. With
high probability, there are at least 2n bits left (if not,
abort the protocol). Alice decides randomly on a set of n
bits to use for the protocol, and the rest to be check bits.
7: Alice and Bob announce the values of their check bits.
If too few of these values agree, they abort the protocol.
8: Alice and Bob distill the final key by using the classi-
cal CSS code [6].
Before we make the security proof, we first take a look
at its fault tolerance property. Since we have already
assumed that the main error of the physical channel is
the collective dephasing error as defined by eq.(1), all
the 2-qubit codes will be sent robustly over the physi-
cal channel, since the collective dephasing error will now
only offer a trivial overall phase factor ei∆. After Bob
receives the 2-qubit codes, he decodes them in step 4.
One may check it easily that after decoding, the original
BB84 states are recovered provided that Bob’s measure-
ment basis to qubit 2 is same with Alice’s “preparation
basis”.
We now give a very simple security proof for the above
protocol in the way that if the protocol above is insecure,
then the known BB84 protocol with CSS code proposed
by Shor and Preskill [6] is also insecure. We first com-
pare our protocol here with Shor-Preskill protocol [6].
The only difference between them is the encoding and
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decoding in our protocol. Without these encoding and
decoding, our protocol is exactly just Shor-Preskill proto-
col. Suppose our protocol is insecure then eavesdropper,
Eve must have a certain intercept-and-resend scheme S
to obtain significant information to the final key in our
protocol. Most generally, S may contain the intercept-
ing the qubits from Alice, operation Aˆ to all qubits and
ancilla, resending the qubits to Bob and finally a certain
operation Oˆ to the rest qubits with Eve. Operation Oˆ
can include certain type of measurement which optimizes
Eve’s information to the final key. We now show that if
scheme S can help Eve to obtain significant information
to the final key of our protocol, then we can always con-
struct a scheme S’ for Eve to obtain the same amount of
information to the final key of Shor-Preskill protocol.
Since the encoding procedure in our protocol requires
no information to the original single qubit state and the
decoding procedure requires no information to the 2-
qubit code state, the encoding and decoding can actually
be done by anybody. Lets consider the Shor-Preskill pro-
tocol. Eve now uses attack S’. In scheme S’, Eve replaces
operation Aˆ by
Encoding −→ Aˆ −→ Decoding
and everything else identical to that in scheme S. Note
that in scheme S’, Eve resends the decoded single qubits
to Bob and discards all “qubit 1” in each code after de-
coding. If Eve uses this S’ to Shor-Preskill’s protocol, ev-
erything will be identical with that in our protocol with
Eve’s attack S. In other words, to Eve, the game of at-
tacking Shor-Preskill protocol with scheme S’ is exactly
identical to the game of attacking our protocol with S
since she may just regard her encoding and decoding as
operations done by someone else. More specifically, given
Shor-Preskill protocol with Eve’s attack S’ and our pro-
tocol with Eve’s attack S, everything of the two protocols
are identical therefore Eve’s information to the final key
of the two protocols must be exactly the same. This is
to say, if our protocol is insecure, Shor-Preskill protocol
must be also insecure. However, the security of Shor-
Preskill protocol has been proven [6] already, therefore
our protocol must be secure.
Actually, we can give a more general theorem about the
security of any protocol with quantum code. Consider
two protocols, protocol P0 and protocol P. In protocol
P0, Alice directly sends Bob each individual qubits. In
protocol P, Alice first encodes each individual qubits by
a certain quantum code and then sends each quantum
codes to Bob. Bob will decode the transmitted codes.
After decoding, Bob obtains one single qubit state from
each code and discarded all other qubits in the same code.
Alice and Bob continue the protocol. Suppose except
for the extra steps of encoding and decoding, everything
else in protocol P0 and protocol P are identical and the
encoding and decoding do not require any information
of the quantum state of the original qubit or the codes,
then we have the following theorem: If protocol P0
is secure then protocol P is also secure. The proof
can obviously be done by the similar arguement: Eve can
also do the encoding and decoding, if P is insecure under
attacking scheme S, we can always construct an attack
S’ for Eve to attack P0 effectively.
Note that there are two important points here. First,
the encoding must be independent of the original quan-
tum state itself therefore Eve can also do so. Also this
shows that the encoding does not offer extra informa-
tion to the qubit state. The simple repetition code does
not work because the encoding needs the information to
the original quantum state and Eve is not able to do so.
Also the repetition code will offer more information to
the bit value. Secondly, Alice and Bob test the error rate
after the decoding, that is to say, they directly test the
error rate to the decoded qubits instead of testing the
error rate of each qubits before decoding and then math-
ematically deduce the error rate after decoding by using
the collective dephasing property of the physical channel.
Note that Eve may change all properties of the physical
channel when the QKD task is being done. But in our
protocol the error test is done after the decoding, this will
defeat any type of Eve’s attack. Since Eve does not want
to be detected, she has to consider the error test done by
Alice and Bob latter on. Therefore she must limit herself
to those types of attack which will not affect the result of
error test to be done by Alice and Bob. (Here Eve does
not have to respect the error rate of the physical channel
since that rate will not be tested in the protocol, but Eve
has to respect the error rate after decoding since this is
the issue that will be tested.) That is to say, if Eve is
not detected by the error test, the protocol will work as
effectively as the case that there is no Eve, since the key
rate of the final key is uniquely determined by the error
rate in test.
After the above security proof, we can now further sim-
plify our protocol. The encoding procedure in step 1 is
just the local operation by Alice. She does not have to re-
ally first prepare the single qubit state and then encodes
it by controlled-not (CNOT) operation. Instead, she may
directly prepare the 2-qubit codes with each of them ran-
domly chosen from {|01〉, |10〉, 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), 1√
2
(|01〉 −
|10〉)} . These random codes can be produced with type
II spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) [8]
with a certain filter [4]. In step 4 of our protocol, Bob
measures qubit 2 in either X basis or Z basis. This re-
quires Bob to change measurement basis rapidly. How-
ever, this task can be done by passive detection with a
50:50 beam splitter, see figure 1. In step 4, Bob takes
unitary transformation U to qubit 2 according to the
measurement result of qubit 1. However, since we have
already limitted ourselves to the 4 BB84 states, instead
of taking U before the measurement to qubit 2, he may
directly measure qubit 2 and then determine the corre-
sponding bit value b according to the measurement result
of both qubit 1 and qubit 2 through the following rule:
{|+〉|0〉, |−〉|0〉, |+〉|+〉, |−〉|−〉} −→ b = 0;
2
{|+〉|1〉, |−〉|1〉, |+〉|−〉, |−〉|+〉} −→ b = 1. (2)
Note that the state preparation and the bit value detec-
tion are all local operations, nobody outside is able to
know how they have actually completed the tasks.
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FIG. 1. The source of two photons in the same line. BS:
beam splitter, M: mirror, NC: nonlinear crystals used in
SPDC process, p: pump light in horizontal polarization, u1:
unitary rotator, u2: phase shifter. u1 takes the value of 0, pi/2,
pi/4 to produce emission state |11〉, |00〉, |φ+〉, respectively. u2
can be either I or σz. F interchanges between states |0〉 and
|1〉 (i.e., filp between horizontal and vertical polarizations).
Intutively, the collective errors could happen more of-
ten to qubits transmitted in the same line. This type of
source can be produced by figure 1. Note that the nonlin-
ear crystal there can emmit either fully entangled state
or product state, dependent on the polarization of pump
beam [7]. We can use the following figure to realize the
QKD protocol in decoherence free subspace:
D3(+,−) BobAlice
MBS
BS
12
D2(+,−) D1(+,−)
FIG. 2. Quantum key distribution in decoherence-free sub-
space. The two qubits are now transmitted in the same line.
Bob will use the results of events of simtaneous clicking of de-
tectors (D1,D2) or detectors (D1,D3). He discrads all events
of cliskings at different time or single clicking.
The security is obvious if we regard the operation by
the dashed rectangular as part of the decoding. This
is now a probabilistic decoding with a rate 75% to dis-
card the code. Consider the case of Shor-Preskill protocol
where Eve use scheme S’ for attacking. Eve detects the
right vertical beam in |±〉 basis and also observes the
photon number of left vertical beam in the same time.
If there is no photon, he blocks the beam and sends Bob
nothing. (Even though there is no photon at that time
point, there could be a delayed photon in the same beam.
Bob blocks the possible delayed photon.) If there is one
photon, he takes unitary transformation U to that pho-
ton and sends it to Bob. U is defined in step 4 of our
protocol. Here Eve has used a very sophisticated photon
detector to detect the photon number but not disturb the
polarization on the left vertical beam. If Eves takes such
operation, to Alice and Bob, they are carrying out Shor-
Preskill protocol with a lossy channel with the lossy rate
of 75%. However, we know that Shor-Preskill protocol is
secure even the channel is lossy, since the corresponding
entanglement purification also works with lossy channel.
Therefore the protocol in fig.2 must be secure since other-
wise Shor-Preskill protocol would be insecure with lossy
channel.
Having considered the QKD protocol with the collec-
tive dephasing channel, we now consider the case with
collective equatorial rotating channel. Such a channel
adds collective rotation
(
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
)
to each indi-
vidual qubits with θ value being random but same to all
qubits simultaneously transmitted. A B92-like protocol
was proposed recently [5], the protocol tolerates the col-
lective rotation error [5]. However the security for that
protocol is not proven [5]. Also in that protocol, they use
4 qubits to encode one bit, this will be technically very
difficult and greatly decrease the efficiency because of
the small emission probability of SPDC process. (Even
though the probability can be improved in the future,
one still cannot arbitrarily use large emission probabil-
ity because this will cause the un-wanted higher order
states.) To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a new
protocol here. Our new protocol has the following advan-
tages: 1) the security proof is given; 2)we use a 2-qubit
state to encode one bit 3) the protocol is BB84-like and
the efficiency is further improved compared with the one
given in ref. [5]. Consider the fact that both 2-qubit state
|φ+〉 and state |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) are unchanged af-
ter any collective equatorial rotation to both qubits. We
can use these two states and their 2 linear superposi-
tions to replace the BB84 state in QKD. Specificaly, the
states transmitted from Alice to Bob are randomly cho-
sen from {|φ+〉, |ψ−〉, 1√
2
(|φ+ + |ψ−〉), 1√
2
(|φ+ − |ψ−〉)}.
Note that 1√
2
(|φ+± |ψ−〉) = 1√
2
(|0〉|±〉+ |1〉|∓〉). There-
fore this type of source can be easily made through com-
bining the type II SPDC emission [8] and an electrically
driven unitary crystal to make random unitary transfor-
mations to one of the two emitted photons. The state
from type II SPDC emission is |φ+〉. The random unitary
transformations produced by the unitary crystal include
unity, joint phase-flip and bit-flip, Hadamard transform
and Hadamard transform with a flipping in {|±〉} basis.
Therefore the required 4 2-bit states will be produced
randomly with equal distribution. Unlike protocol in the
case of dephasing channel [4], here we don’t have to use
a disentangler to generate the source.
According to our theorem, to show the security of this
protocol, we need only to show that these 4 2-bit states
can be in principle generated from BB84 states without
any information of the BB84 state and Bob can recover
the original BB84 state on a single qubit by decoding
the 2-bit code. If we can construct the encoding and
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decoding, the security of the protocol is equivalent to
that of Bb84 protocol. The encoding indeed exists. To
encode, Alice makes the following unitary transformation
on the BB84 qubit (the first qubit) and the ancilla (the
second qubit) which is in state |0〉:
|00〉 −→ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉); |10〉 −→ 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). (3)
In such a way, BB84 state |±〉 with ancilla |0〉 will be-
come 1√
2
(|φ+〉±|ψ−〉). So in principle, there is indeed an
encoding scheme to produce the requested 4 2-bit states
from BB84 states. Now we show Bob can recover the
original single qubit state. To do so Bob measuress the
first qubit in Z basis, if he obtains |0〉, the original state
has recovered on the second qubit, if he obtains |1〉, he
takes unitary transformation Σ =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
to the sec-
ond qubit and the original state is also recovered up to an
overall phase factor on the second qubit. However, such
a unitary transformation according to the measurement
outcome of the first qubit requires active operations. We
can simplify it to the equivalent passive operation with
post-selection. Without any loss of generality, a mea-
surement to state Σ|χ〉 in basis {|q〉〈q|} is equivalent to
a measurement to |χ〉 in basis {Σ†|q〉〈q|Σ} followed by a
unitary transformation Σ. This is to say, Bob takes the
individual measurement to the first qubit in Z basis and
the second qubit in either X basis or Z basis and deter-
mine the bit value b according to the joint measurement
outcome on both qubits:
{|0〉|0〉, |1〉|1〉, |0〉|+〉, |1〉|−〉} −→ b = 0;
{|0〉|1〉, |1〉|0〉, |0〉|−〉, |1〉|+〉} −→ b = 1. (4)
Note that Bob’s record on “measurement basis” to each
encoded bit is same as his measurement basis to the sec-
ond qubit. He will discard those results obtained from a
wrong measurement basis through classical communica-
tion with Alice.
Moreover, if we exchange the two qubits before any
measurement done by Bob, all results of the protocol is
unchanged. That is to say, here Bob can chose any qubit
as “qubit 1”. Thus in the application Bob just make
sure the measurement basis to one qubit is Z, while the
measurement to the other qubit can be either X or Z and
then use the rule of eq.(4) to determine the bit value.
The experimantal scheme is given by the following figure
3. Bob will use the results of any 2-fold clicking events
in {(D1, Di), (D3, Di); i = 1, 2, 3, 4}. He determines the
bit value according to eq.(4). Note that the 2-fold event
(D1,D1) or (D3,D3) means that detector D1 or D3 clicks
2 times at different time. Those events of 2-fold clicking
which contain neither D1 nor D3 will be discarded.
BS
M
BS
U
SPDC
2 1
BS M
Alice
Bob
C
D2(+,−)
D1(0,1)D4(+,−)
D3(0,1)
BS
FIG. 3. Robust quantum key distribution with collective
equatorial rotating channel. U is a crystal driven electri-
cally to produce random unitary transformation selected from
{I,Σ,H, σzH}. H is a Hadamard transform which inter-
changes {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉}, respectively. The devices
inside the dashed rectangular are denoted by C.
Foe completness, we give the following protocol with
collective rotating channel:
Protocol 2. 1: Alice creates (4 + δ)n 2-qubit quantum
codes with each of them randomly chosen from the set
{|φ+〉, |ψ−〉, 1√
2
(|φ+〉 + |ψ−〉), 1√
2
(|φ+〉 − |ψ−〉)}. 2: For
each 2-bit code, if it is in state |φ+〉 or |ψ−〉 she puts down
the “preparation basis” as “Z basis” otherwise she puts
down the “preparation basis” as “X basis”. For those
code states of |φ+〉 or { 1√
2
(|φ+〉+|ψ−〉), she denotes a bit
value 0 ; for those code states of |ψ−〉 or { 1√
2
(|φ+〉−|ψ−〉),
she denotes a bit value 1. 3: Alice sends the 2-qubit codes
to Bob. 4: Bob receives the (4 + δ)n 2-qubit codes. To
each code, He measures one qubit (say, qubit 1) in Z basis
and measures the other qubit (say, qubit 2) in either X
basis or Z basis. Bob denotes his “measurement basis”
just the same of his measurement basis to qubit 2. And
he determines the bit value correspondoing to each code
by eq.(4). 5: Alice announces her “preparation basis”
for each codes. 6: Alice and Bob discards those bits on
which Bob has measured in a basis diffrent from Alice’s
preparation basis. With high probability, there are at
least 2n bits left (if not, abort the protocol). Alice decides
randomly on a set of n bits to use for the protocol, and
the rest to be check bits. 7: Alice and Bob announce
the values of their check bits. If too few of these values
agree, they abort the protocol. 8: Alice and Bob distill
the final key by using the classical CSS code [6].
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